Hizen, Yoichi (2015) Does a Least-Preferred Candidate Win a Seat? A Comparison of Three Electoral Systems. Economies, 3 (1). pp. 2-36. ISSN 2227-7099
![[thumbnail of economies-03-00002.pdf]](http://science.scholarsacademic.com/style/images/fileicons/text.png)
economies-03-00002.pdf - Published Version
Download (404kB)
Abstract
In this paper, the differences between two variations of proportional representation (PR), open-list PR and closed-list PR, are analyzed in terms of their ability to accurately reflect voter preference. The single nontransferable vote (SNTV) is also included in the comparison as a benchmark. We construct a model of voting equilibria with a candidate who is least preferred by voters in the sense that replacing the least-preferredcandidate in the set of winners with any loser is Pareto improving, and our focus is on whether the least-preferred candidate wins under each electoral system. We demonstrate that the least-preferred candidate never wins under the SNTV, but can win under open-list PR, although this is less likely than winning under closed-list PR.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Subjects: | STM Archives > Multidisciplinary |
Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email support@stmarchives.com |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2023 11:37 |
Last Modified: | 05 Jun 2024 10:16 |
URI: | http://science.scholarsacademic.com/id/eprint/1364 |